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called for temperance in their application,2" the need for some
control is apparent.
Although the defendant's rights may be protected by the suggested methods, the eventual solution lies in a working agreement
between the news media and the judiciary. An initial acceptance of
the necessity for such controls and voluntary restraint by both
the press and the Bar should effect an harmonious solution to
the conflict.
lack William DeBolt

Evidence-Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony of Defendant
Physician When Called as Adverse Witness
P, brought a medical malpractice suit alleging that her colon
was torn by the negligent use of a bardex tube during X-ray
procedures in Ds' office. At the trial Ds were called as adverse
witnesses. The court refused to permit P to adversely examine Ds
on matters involving their judgment, knowledge and opinions as
experts. The trial court, directed a verdict for Ds. Held, affirmed.
In a medical malpractice action P will not be permitted to call a
defendant physician as an adverse witness and extract expert
testimony from him to prove a charge of malpractice. Hoffman
v. Naslund, 144 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1966).
It is well settled that a defendant physician can be called as an
adverse witness and be examined as to pertinent facts in the case.'
However, the issue is not settled as to whether such defendant
can be required as an adverse witness to give his expert opinion on
the matters in question. Although the courts are about equally
divided on this question, the trend is toward requiring defendant
physicians to give testimony involving their expert knowledge and
opinion when called as adverse witnesses.'
25

The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HA.v. L. REv. 91, 185 (1966).

26 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

27 Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1958).
1 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,
203 N.E.2d 469 (1964); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915
(1931).
2 Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).
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The case of Ericksen v. Wilson,3 upon which the principal case
relied in reaching its decision, is a leading case supporting the
proposition that expert testimony cannot be extracted from a
defendant physician when called as an adverse witness in a malpractice action. In Ericksen the court stated that cross-examination
under a rule similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b) was
not designed to force a defendant into becoming a plaintiffs expert
witness and held that the trial court in its discretion could limit
the extent of the cross-examination of the adverse party. The
rationale followed by the courts in reaching the position reflected
in the Ericksen case is simply that it is not the purpose of a rule
allowing examination of adverse witnesses to permit the plaintiff
to establish his case in chief by expert opinion secured from the
defendant.4 The underlying basis for this rationale seems to be
that it would be unfair to allow the plaintiff to force the defendant
to become his expert.' Other than this "not the purpose" of the rule
argument the cases offer no insight into why such a line of inquiry
by the plaintiff should not be permitted.
On the other hand, a series of more recent decisions have presented convincing arguments why expert opinion should be allowed
to be elicited from the defendant physician when called as an
adverse witness in a medical malpractice action. The California
Supreme Court in Lawless v. Calaway6 stated that the purpose of a
statute allowing a defendant to be adversely examined is to enable
a party to elicit from his adversary any relevant matter in issue in
the case. Since expert testimony is ordinarily required to prove
the relevant issues in an action for malpractice, it necessarily follows
3266 Minn 401 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963). This case cites six cases as
persuasive authority ?or the holding: Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App 436
21 N.E.2d 869 (1938) and Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d
255 (1941) were subsequently overruled by Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.
2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965); McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear &
Throat Hosp., 16 App. Div.2d 374, 228 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1964) was appealed
and reversed as reported in 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964): 'Hullv.
Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944) is distinguishable because of
wording of the statute and a related local evidence rtang; leaving only a
1939 and 1913 case as proper authority, Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 .. 389,
237 N.W. 915 (1931) and Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967

(1913).
4

Hundred v. Randlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931); Osborn

v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913).
- Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965);
Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
624 Cal.2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).
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that the standard of care ordinarily exercised by doctors in the
community (being a relevant issue) can be established by the
plaintiff under an "adverse witness" statute. A more recent case,
McDermott v. ManhattanEye, Ear and Throat Hosp.,7 pointed out
that modern rules have removed the common law disabilities of
parties to testify as witnesses. The court went on to say that plain
sense and reason suggest that any living witness who can throw
light upon a fact in issue should state what he knows. The doctor's
knowledge of proper medical practice and his possible awareness
of his deviation from the standard is as much a "fact" as are the
examination and diagnosis that was made. The Ohio court in
Oleksiw v. Weidener8 pointed out that the cases not permitting the
adverse witness to give expert opinion do not specify anything
inherently wrong with allowing such questioning, but seem to base
their holding on the idea that it would not be fair or sporting to
allow the plaintiff to force the defendant to become his expert.
The court stated that fairness should not be the question, nor should
the question be one of self-incrimination. "A civil defendant has
no protection against subjecting himself to liability. If his testimony will provide facts which will aid the court in arriving at a
just decision, he has a duty to testify." The benefit to the judicial
system under this interpretation of "adverse witness" statutes far
outweighs any loss to the sporting aspect of adversary proceedings.
In what appears to be the only federal case in point, the eighth
circuit in Thompson v. Lillehei,9 while not ruling on the issue,
indicated that the plaintiff in a malpractice suit under Rule 43(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" could elicit opinion from
the adverse witness. The court, however, refused to reverse the
trial court for limiting plaintiffs' line of inquiry because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by the trial
court's ruling.
Rule 43(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is
15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964).
82 Ohio St.2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
9273
F. 2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
10 "Scope
of Examination and Cross-Examination . . . A party may call
an adverse party . . . and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party .... FED. R. Crv. P. 43(b).
7
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exactly the same as federal rule 43(b)." In construing this rule the
West Virginia court in Duling v. Blueield Sanitarium, Inc.,2 by
dictum, indicated that expert testimony could be extracted from
an adverse witness. Although this was not a malpractice case, a
doctor, being a director of the hospital, was called as an adverse
witness under rule 43(b). The court, while not required to rule
on the point, said that the trial court erred in holding that the
doctor was not required to answer any proper question involving
his expert knowledge or expert opinion as a member of the medical
profession.
Although the Duling case is the only West Virginia case that
deals directly with this question of law, prior West Virginia cases
indicate that a liberal interpretation of 43 (b) is warranted. Rule
43(b) permits the calling of an adverse party and questioning him
as if on cross-examination. This takes on special meaning when
combined with the fact that in West Virginia a party to a suit may,
on cross-examination, be questioned as to all pertinent issues.1"
Since a showing of lack of professional skill is a pertinent issue in
a malpractice case generally provable only by expert testimony,"4
the conclusion seems inescapable that a physician in West Virginia
should be required to give expert testimony as an adverse witness.
The reasoning here developed gains added strength when combined
with the fact that in West Virginia an expert can be subpoenaed
and compelled
to testify concerning his expert opinion and knowl5
edge.
The principal case stands for the proposition that a plaintiff in
a medical malpractice suit can not compel the defendant physician
under an "adverse witness" rule to give expert testimony. Although the holding is supported by authority, it appears not to be
in keeping with the more recent decisions and has little argumentive
support. The West Virginia court, by dictum, appears to be in
accord with the recent trend, i.e., would require answers to ques-

I LucAR AmD SILVE~smI,

W. Va. RuLEs, 353 (1960).
W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965) (dictum).
' Ingles v. Stealey 85 W. Va. 155, 101 S.E. 167 (1919).
14
Schroeder v. Adldns, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965). But
see Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934).
IsEaly v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S. E. 525 (1929).
See Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944) where an opposite
holding was the basis for not requiring expert opinion under the New Jersey
adverse witness statute.
12149
3
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tions put to a defendant physician called as an adverse witness
involving his expert knowledge or expert opinion. This dictum is
supported by related West Virginia cases and appears to be an
accurate forecast of the court's position.
K. PaulDavis

Income Tax-Reincorporation and Liquidation
D, corporate stockholders of a closed corporation, adopted a
section 337 plan of complete liquidation which provided for dissolution of the corporation and distribution of all the assets within
twelve months. Pursuant to the plan, the operating assets of the
liquidated corporation were transferred to a new corporation in
exchange for stock. The remaining liquid assets of the liquidated
corporation were distributed to the stockholders. The liquidated
corporation was then dissolved. The transaction was bona fide in
every respect and any tax avoidance purpose was negligible. D
reported their gain on the liquidation as a long term capital gain.
The liquidated corporation's return reported no taxable income on
the sale of assets under section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The Commissioner contended that this transaction constituted
a section 368 reorganization; therefore, the distributions to stockholders should be taxed as ordinary income and the gain on the
sale of operating assets should be recognized. The Tax Court ruled
in favor of the taxpayers and the Commissioner appealed. Held,
affirmed. (1) Assets received by shareholders in a liquidation
pursuant to a reincorporation transaction were taxable at capital
gains rates; and, (2) the liquidated corporation received no
recognizable gain on the sale of its assets. Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
In recent years the tax avoidance possibilities of liquidationreincorporations have been quite perplexing to tax advisors, the
Commissioner, Congress and the courts. Three interrelated questions frequently arise in connection with this type of a transaction.
(1) Should the transfer of operating assets to a new corporation
controlled by the shareholders of the liquidated corporation and
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